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Executive Summary 
The Covid-19 pandemic has triggered health, economic 
and social crises of unprecedented proportions that have 
the potential to seriously undermine the (already slow) 
progress made by developing countries towards achieving 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The World Bank’s 
(WB) own figures suggest that by 2021 an additional 110 to 
150 million people will have fallen into extreme poverty, living 
on less than US$ 1.90 per day. The impacts of the Covid-19 
pandemic have resulted in calls for ambitious responses, 
both in terms of scale and policy, under the broad headline 
of “building back better”. This briefing paper analyses the 
response of the World Bank Group (WBG) to the Covid-19 
pandemic and reveals a persistent prioritisation of private 
over public interests, both in the immediate pandemic 
response and beyond. In fact, the WBG appears to have 
seized the current crisis as an opportunity to intensify its 
Maximising Finance for Development (MFD) approach.   
The MFD approach, which has been implemented by the WBG 
since 2017, builds on previous strategies and represents a 
systematic and comprehensive effort to promote private 
sector development. The approach seeks to place the private 
sector at the heart of development, including in public service 
provision. The idea is for traditional Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) to take on a catalytic role in the mobilisation 
of private finance for development, including in the poorest 
countries. The approach deploys various instruments, many 
of which are referred to as “blended finance”. They range 
from offering technical advice on how to reform policies and 
institutions in a particular country and/or sector, to taking “first 
equity loss” positions in private investment deals or providing 
loans to private sector agents at subsidised rates. 
This WBG agenda reveals the unwillingness of the donor 
community to take concrete measures to scale up and 
strengthen public financing of development, and an inability to 
agree on a multilateral resolution to unsustainable sovereign 
debts. Furthermore, it demonstrates a lack of resolve to create 
a global body to deal with massive tax avoidance and evasion, 
which is strongly detrimental to countries in the global south.
Major donors and international institutions have failed to 
respond to a growing body of literature and evidence that 
calls into question the effectiveness of this approach and 
highlights its considerable negative consequences. Finally, it 
reflects a fundamental underlying prejudice against the public 
sector, which has been fuelled by austerity policies that have 
undermined its ability to deliver.
Our analysis highlights five points: 
1. During the immediate emergency response, the WBG 
earmarked almost 60 per cent of the US$ 14 billion of the 
Fast Track Covid-19 Facility (US$ 8 billion) to be allocated 
through its private sector arm, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), instead of its public sector arms, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Development Association 
(IDA). They received US$ 6 billion. This does not respond 
to multiple calls across the policy spectrum for stronger 
public systems.  
2. IFC financial sector clients and multinational companies 
have particularly benefited from the pandemic response. 
According to publicly available information, by late June 
2020, 68 per cent (in value terms) of IFC Covid-19 projects 
targeted financial institutions. This corresponds to the 
first four months of the WBG’s pandemic response and 
the close of its 2020 fiscal year. The WBG claims that this 
is to assist Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) 
in navigating the fallout from the pandemic but this 
strategy is yet to produce results. In addition, around 50 
per cent of IFC supported companies are either majority-
owned by multinational companies or are themselves 
international conglomerates. There is a high risk that the 
IFC emergency response has not reached the countries, 
sectors and companies most in need of support.
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3. Increased pressure to “get money out the door” has 
raised clear implementation challenges. In particular, 
the IFC’s focus on financial institutions has fallen short 
with regard to transparency and accountability, while 
on the WB’s side there have been questions about the 
very limited to no stakeholder engagement as projects 
are rolled out. This comes in addition to the shrinking 
space for civil society organisations (CSOs) to actively 
participate and increased reprisals against human rights 
activists by national governments. 
4. Regarding its relationship with governments, the 
WBG remains set on structural reforms in support of 
liberalisation and deregulation. While most WB loans to 
governments that have been approved in the emergency 
response period have aimed at addressing the health 
crisis, others have a broader scope and include more 
traditional reforms in support of the private sector. This 
indicates a strong and continued commitment by the WBG 
to a market-driven approach which, among other things, 
has resulted in adverse health outcomes and negative 
impacts on gender equality.
5. The WBG ultimately aims to “build back better” by 
accelerating and scaling-up its support for private sector 
solutions. This includes an enhanced focus on public-
private partnerships (PPPs) to deliver ostensibly public 
services, despite well-documented evidence regarding 
the multiple risks and implications of PPPs for the public 
sector and for citizens, including their high cost, fiscal 
risks, questionable effectiveness, and equity implications. 
On closer inspection of the MFD approach in a pilot country 
like Kenya, it is clear that both prior to and during the 
pandemic, the WBG has relentlessly pursued an agenda of 
promoting private sector interests, including in core public 
sectors like health and education. This raises serious issues 
regarding who benefits from this agenda and at what cost. 
Indeed, the implementation of the MFD risks worsening 
inequalities and amplifying the economic and social fallout 
of Covid-19.
Policy recommendations
The WBG is a public institution with a development 
mandate and as such has a duty to deliver for the public 
good. The development financing paradigm for the next 
decade is at stake. 
This briefing suggests short-term policy recommendations 
focused on the Covid-19 response and long-term measures 
that would allow the WBG to reconnect with its core 
mandate, which is ending extreme poverty and promoting 
shared prosperity. 
In the short term:  
• The WBG needs to restore the balance between the 
public and private sector in its Covid-19 response, 
including in its modalities and instruments. Developing 
countries are in need of concessional resources to 
strengthen their public systems, particularly health, 
education and social protection, and to stimulate the 
economic recovery. 
• Both in its emergency response and with regard to long-
term finance, the WBG must abandon policy conditions 
that undermine economic policies and regulatory 
measures aimed at strengthening domestic economies, 
jobs and livelihoods and civic rights. This includes 
abandoning those policy conditions that favour the 
private sector and undermine the strengthening of public 
services and the delivery of public goods. 
• The WBG should make sure its emergency and long-term 
programmes are consistent with and strengthen climate 
resilience and the shift to low carbon pathways. 
• The IFC should commit to publicly disclosing the ultimate 
recipients of its support and what this assistance is 
used for. This would ensure that IFC programmes help 
preserve employment and do not serve to bail out 
private financial institutions. 
• The IFC should stop its support to commercial private 
health facilities that undermine public system building 
and that arguably has pernicious implications for 
women, lower-income or vulnerable populations. 
Long term measures
Given the problematic track-record of the MFD, the WBG 
should seriously re-evaluate this approach. If the institution 
wishes to “build back better”, it needs to consider the broad 
implications of its agenda and, instead, move towards a 
human rights-based approach that builds resilience and 
strengthens public systems. 
At its core, this will require adequate levels of public finance 
to be achieved through, among other things, tackling tax 
avoidance and evasion and by using ODA to strengthen 
the provision of public services. The WBG, as a leading 
development actor, has to play its part and rethink its 
approach to blended finance. Immediate cancellation of 
debt payments should be linked to a more comprehensive 
approach to debt crisis resolution under the auspices of the 
United Nations (UN). The implementation of these measures 
would allow for an equitable and resilient recovery in line 
with the SDG and Paris commitments.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, most discussions about development 
finance have focused on using public money and institutions 
to leverage private finance. The World Bank Group (WBG) 
has been a lead player in this field and its Maximising 
Finance for Development (MFD) approach is perhaps 
the most widely known example of this. The WBG’s MFD 
approach has structured the Bank’s operations since 2017 
and its implementation is an indication of the institution’s 
commitment to increasing the involvement of the private 
sector in development. An important objective is to attract 
trillions of dollars managed by private institutional investors 
to help finance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
“De-risking” private finance is central to this approach. 
The agenda argues that “better and smarter Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) can help catalyse and 
leverage financing from diverse sources towards the SDGs”.1 
Various instruments have been rolled out to operationalise 
the blending of public and private finance (blended finance) 
approach at the heart of this new agenda. These include 
guarantees, subsidies, first-loss equity positions and public-
private partnerships (PPPs).2 
The use of ODA (or donor funds) to mobilise private finance 
is not new to the WBG’s private sector lending arm, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which has had a 
blended finance portfolio since the late 1990s. However, in 
2017, this became central to its corporate strategy (IFC 3.0)3 
and, that same year, the WBG launched the IDA Private Sector 
Window (PSW), which constituted a significant scaling up 
of its efforts to mobilise aid resources in support of private 
investment in low-income countries (LICs) and fragile and 
conflict-affected states (FCSs). Subsequently, the capital 
increase approved by WBG’s shareholders in 2018 came with 
specific and ambitious targets to move this agenda forward,4 
despite multiple critiques of the central tenets of the approach.5 
At the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the WBG was 
called upon to respond quickly, as the demand for support 
from developing countries increased dramatically. In March 
2020, the WBG announced a US$ 14 billion package of fast-
track Covid-19 financing (FTCF) to support countries and 
companies in their efforts to manage the negative impacts 
of the pandemic. Moreover, as the crisis projected a major 
global recession, the Bank announced that a further US$ 160 
billion would be committed over the next 15 months. 
This briefing analyses the response of the WBG to the Covid-19 
pandemic. It does so by presenting first, in Section 2, the 
WBG’s MFD approach to development finance as its pre-
existing strategy. The paper then proceeds, in Section 3, with 
a brief account of the WBG’s response to Covid-19, which is 
followed, in Section 4, by a critical analysis. This reveals a 
persistent prioritisation of private over public interests by 
the WBG, both in the immediate pandemic response and 
beyond, as the pandemic offers the institution an opportunity 
to accelerate its MFD approach. Furthermore, the WBG’s 
commitment to the promotion of private finance is likely to 
be compounded by the limited fiscal space that developing 
countries will face in the post-Covid-19 context. Section 5, then, 
illustrates in further detail the possible ramifications of this 
approach for Kenya. Kenya is a long-standing client of the WBG 
and a pilot of its MFD approach. Closer scrutiny of the details of 
the WBG’s engagement with the country allows for an in-depth 
analysis of some of the fundamental issues inherent in the 
promotion of private over public interests. The final section 
concludes and provides concrete policy recommendations. 
2. Maximising finance for development 
 at the World Bank Group
Over the last decade, the WBG has been a lead player in 
reorienting development cooperation so that it becomes 
focused on using public money and institutions to leverage 
private finance.6 This was evidenced in the run up to the Third 
United Nations Conference on Financing for Development, 
resulting in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), which 
put the private sector at the heart of the UN’s strategy to 
finance the SDGs. The WBG, together with its sister institution, 
the International Monetary Fund and five major multilateral 
development banks explicitly argued for development finance 
in the post-2015 era to become centrally organised around 
the “blending” or “leveraging” of private finance by public 
resources.7 A key document, “From Billions to Trillions: 
Transforming Development Finance Post-2015 Financing for 
Development”, advocated for a “paradigmatic shift” building on 
the proposition that “the world needs intelligent development 
finance that goes well beyond filling financing gaps and that 
can be used strategically to unlock, leverage and catalyse 
private flows and domestic resources”.8 
The core idea of this approach is to mobilise ODA to de-risk 
private flows. Public sector measures are considered necessary 
to encourage private investment as they seek to decrease 
perceived risk or increase anticipated returns.9 These measures 
can take various forms, from offering technical advice on how 
to reform policies and institutions in a particular country and/
or sector, to taking first equity loss positions or providing loans 
to private sector agents at subsidised rates.10 
4This approach reflects an unwillingness of the donor 
community to scale up and strengthen public financing 
of development, or at least to meet previously agreed 
commitments to deliver 0.7 per cent of gross national income 
in aid. It also suggests reticence to create a global body 
through which tax issues could be resolved to tackle massive 
tax avoidance and evasion, which is detrimental to countries 
in the global south. Without these measures, progress on 
the SDGs relies solely on limited ODA acting as a catalyst for 
increased private investment. It has become commonplace 
in donor rhetoric to hear that “the contribution of the private 
sector to achieving development gains must be scaled up, 
particularly in the poorest countries”.11
The WB’s MFD approach, launched formally in 2017, is a 
good example of the push to increase the private sector 
contribution. The MFD, previously called the “Cascade 
approach”, was set out as the vision for the WBG for 2030.12 
Under the MFD approach, private finance is preferred as a first 
option for “sustainable” investment. If this cannot be accessed, 
governments and donors need to consider if upstream 
interventions “to address market failures” can lead to a flow 
of private finance. These measures include reviewing country 
and sector policies, regulations, pricing, institutions and 
capacity. Failing this, the next option is to consider the potential 
for various blended finance instruments like guarantees, 
other risk-sharing instruments and PPPs, to attract private 
investors. Only as a last resort should policy makers turn to 
public finance. This was affirmed by Philippe Le Houérou, 
Chief Executive Officer of the IFC at the launch of its new 
strategy (IFC 3.0), when he explained: “Only when all of these 
possibilities are exhausted, should we seek to use the limited 
sources of public finance”.13 This approach, initially focused 
on infrastructure, is expected to be expanded to finance, 
education, health and agribusiness. To implement this strategy, 
nine pilot countries were identified: Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, and Vietnam. In 
addition, according to the WB, MFD-related pilot engagements 
are underway in countries like Peru and Sri Lanka.14 
The MFD approach is an integral part of a broader institutional 
effort to create markets and crowd-in private finance. In 
particular, the MFD complements the IFC 3.0 corporate 
strategy, whose “success […] requires the active involvement 
and collaboration of the WB in creating enabling policy and 
regulatory environments and on de-risking the private sector’s 
entry into these environments”.15 Interestingly, the MFD came 
with a call from then-WB president Jim Kim for a capital 
increase for the institution. As Kim put it when addressing 
WBG shareholders: “To deliver what countries need at the 
scale you expect of us – we need more resources […] We can 
play a critical role in finding win-win solutions, where we 
maximize financing for development, and create opportunities 
for the owners of capital to make higher returns”.16 
Despite not receiving initial support from the United States 
(US) Treasury, a capital increase was finally approved by 
WB shareholders in April 2018.17 The capital increase was 
accompanied by a policy package,18 which outlined four key 
pillars for WBG operations: (a) serve all clients; (b) create 
markets; (c) lead on global issues; and (d) improve the 
business model. While WBG shareholders referred to this as 
“a transformative package”, in reality, there was little new in 
it. Instead, the capital increase served to endorse the MFD 
and the WBG’s role in advancing the AAAA, while it helped 
translate policy objectives into policy targets.19 One such 
target is the IFC’s pledge to deliver 40 per cent of its annual 
commitments in IDA countries and FCSs.20 
The WB took an active role in promoting the MFD across 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and its principles 
were subsequently adopted as the Hamburg Principles, 
which provide a “common framework among MDBs 
to increase levels of private investment in support of 
development”.21 As such, the MDBs have agreed to focus 
their operations in three main areas: 
i. continue to strengthen investment capacity and policy 
frameworks at national and subnational levels
ii. enhance private sector involvement and prioritise 
commercial sources of financing
iii. enhance the catalytic role of the MDBs themselves
At the WBG, a scorecard system tracks performance on 
private mobilisations22 and staff incentives have become 
tied to success in this regard.23 The donor community’s 
strong commitment to the approach is emblematic in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD) redefinition of how to measure ODA, as part of which 
donors reached a provisional agreement in December 
2018 to include private sector instruments, such as equity 
investments and guarantees typically offered to private 
companies in the reporting of ODA.24 Moreover, the new 
statistic of Total Support for Sustainable Development, aimed 
to increase transparency of different flows, seeks to include 
official resources to mobilise private development finance. 
This measure would also “potentially cover private resources 
mobilised through public schemes, as well as the activities 
of diverse financial intermediaries, including collective 
investment vehicles and venture capital funds”.25
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The WBG’s strategic use of blended finance took on a specific 
form when, during the 2017-2020 replenishment of its 
concessional arm (the International Development Association, 
IDA1826), donors agreed to create a US$ 2.5 billion pilot IFC-
MIGA [Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency] Private 
Sector Window (PSW).27 The PSW places donor aid resources 
under the direct control of the IFC (US$ 2 billion) and MIGA 
(US$ 0.5 billion) to support their attempt to mobilise private 
investments in low income and fragile country contexts. 
Although the PSW represents a small fraction of IDA18 for 
the WB, it serves as an “illustration of how the World Bank 
Group is putting the Finance for Development (FfD) agenda 
into action”.28 IDA18, therefore, represented an important step 
in implementing the WBG’s vision of MFD,29 also including the 
possibility of IDA to raise funds from capital markets, with the 
first IDA bond raising US$ 1.5 billion from investors in April 
2018. However, raising funds in capital markets has recently 
raised concerns by representatives of the United States 
Congress regarding the financial viability of the IDA.30 
For the IDA, the PSW provides an opportunity “to make 
strategic use of public resources to catalyse private 
investments in these challenging markets, by leveraging 
IFC’s and MIGA’s business models and client relationships”.31 
Its creation was seen as complementing the WB’s more 
traditional work via its public sector concessional window, 
IDA, which itself seeks to promote policy reforms to 
improve “business environments”, by now allowing it to 
de-risk private investments more directly.32 What this 
means in practice, is that aid resources are used to attract 
and subsidise private sector investments to operationalise 
a strategy that sees the private sector as key actor to 
improve development outcomes in low income and fragile 
country settings.33 The PSW institutionalises WBG-wide 
collaboration that seeks to harness public resources 
for the private sector. This was seen as essential to 
achieve the SDG 2030 Agenda: “Making progress on the 
2030 Agenda will require a paradigm shift, one in which 
scarce ODA serves as a catalyst for increased private 
sector investment”.34 It should also be noted that while, 
previously, the IFC delivered hundreds of millions of its 
profits in support of IDA lending, it is now a net recipient 
of IDA funding. At the same time, a smaller share of its 
investments reaches IDA countries.35 
For the IFC, the IDA PSW represented a significant 
development and opportunity to craft a key role for itself 
in the blended finance landscape. Where it had previously 
managed smaller pilot blended finance schemes, mainly 
with an emphasis on climate finance,36 it was now endowed 
with substantial donor resources to mobilise in support of 
its new strategy. The PSW became a “critical component” 
of the IFC 3.0 strategy “to tackle private sector challenges 
by creating markets and mobilisation”.37 This was combined 
with the idea that the de-risking mechanisms would assist 
in “unlocking” new sources of funds from institutional 
investors.38  Indeed, the “From Billions to Trillions” agenda 
sought to capitalise on matching large (unused) savings to 
de-risked investment opportunities in LICSs.39  
Despite being celebrated as emblematic of the WBG’s MFD, 
and instrumental to deliver the IFC 3.0 strategy, the IDA PSW 
did not fulfil expectations.40 By late 2019 (just six months 
before the US$ 2.5 billion IDA PSW should have been fully 
allocated), the PSW had committed just over US$ 0.5 billion 
– only slightly more than a fifth of the resources available 
to it.41 Significant concerns were raised regarding the lack 
of transparency in the way in which aid subsidies were 
finding their way to private firms via the PSW. As Charles 
Kenny, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, 
put it: “Taxpayers as well as supposed beneficiaries have 
the right to know how PSW aid is being used”.42 United 
States (US) Congresswoman, Maxine Waters, Chair of the 
US House Committee on Financial Services, led the charge. 
She claimed that the IDA PSW was “subsidizing private firms 
selected without competition on the basis of unsolicited 
proposals.” And suggested that the PSW was “likely to 
prioritize financial returns over positive development 
impacts, which [would] be difficult to monitor.” She added 
that the PSW “stands in conflict with the World Bank’s own 
principles that call for subsidies to be justified, transparent, 
competitively based, focused on impact, and guarded against 
rent-seeking opportunities”).43 This was followed by the 
threat of withholding Congressional support for the IFC’s 
capital increase that had been agreed in 2018, unless “these 
transfers stop, or at a minimum are competitively based and 
fully transparent down to the amounts and purpose of aid 
going to which firms and projects”.44 
6World Bank Group COVID Response • October 2020
These objections reflected more general concerns regarding 
blended finance. These range from: limited private sector 
mobilisation, inadequate risk sharing, lack of financial 
additionality, lopsided leverage ratios,  unconvincing 
development impact, lack of transparency and accountability, 
high cost of investments, the creation of new liabilities, 
limited domestic ownership, and various types of conflicting 
interests, not to mention the little appetite of private 
investors for low income and fragile country settings and 
hence their low share of blended finance.45 Nevertheless, the 
IDA19 replenishment, concluded in December 2019, saw a 
renewal of the PSW as part of the agreement to finance the 
WB’s aid activities for the period of July 2020 to June 2023. 
However, at the same time, the PSW’s resource envelope 
was held constant (at US$ 2.5 billion), reflecting donor 
unwillingness to scale up the approach.46vid-19 
3. The Covid-19 pandemic and the 
 World Bank Group response 
As Covid-19 started to wreak havoc in early 2020, successive 
governments locked down their economies for months on 
end. The measures to contain the health crisis triggered 
economic and social crises of unprecedented proportions, 
with women disproportionately impacted.47 This came in 
addition to increasing inequalities and the continued negative 
impacts of climate change.
In April 2020, the IMF warned the world about the scale of 
the crisis, saying that “the global economy will experience 
the worst recession since the Great Depression”,48 prompting 
calls from the global community to “build back better”. 
The WBG estimated that the additional financing needs 
for developing countries arising from the crisis would be 
exceptionally high and likely to persist.49 The WBG’s latest 
poverty projections suggest that by 2021, an additional 110 
to 150 million people will have fallen into extreme poverty, 
living on less than US$ 1.90 per day.50 In September, the 
United Nations Commission for Trade and Development 
argued that “there is a very serious danger that the shortfall 
will drag developing countries into another lost decade 
ending any hope of realizing the ambition of the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development.”51 Furthermore, decades of 
austerity policies and privatisation strategies have long 
undermined public health systems and stifled progress on 
universal social protection, which has undoubtedly fuelled the 
dramatic global fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic.52
The WBG quickly introduced measures that sought to mitigate 
both the immediate health emergency, as well as the longer-
term fallout from the major disruption to traditional economic 
and social life. In mid-March 2020, it approved a US$ 14 
billion Fast Track Covid-19 Facility (FTCF) for an emergency 
response to the virus (see Figure 1). This constituted “the 
largest and fastest crisis response in the Bank Group’s 
history”.53 It entailed the approval of “specific waivers and 
exceptions required to enable the rapid preparation and 
implementation of country operations processed under the 
Facility”.54 Moreover, as the crisis projected a major global 
recession, the Bank committed to provide US$ 160 billion in 
finance over the next 15 months, with US$ 50 billion for LICs, 
and US$ 330-350 billion by the end of June 2023. 
A closer look at how the FTCF resources were distributed 
inside the WBG reveals a preference for private sector 
activities (see Figure 1). While US$ 6 billion was to be 
disbursed through the public sector arms of the WB (the 
IBRD and IDA) to strengthen national systems, including 
health, education and social protection, the larger share of 
this package (US$ 8 billion) was to be channelled through the 
WBG’s private sector arm, the IFC. According to the WBG, “the 
IFC will provide direct lending to existing clients affected by 
the outbreak, as well as support financial institution partner 
clients so they can continue lending to businesses”.55 It was 
the WBG’s assessment that “[t]he developing world needs 
private sector investment now more than ever”.56 This was 
consistent with the IFC’s strategic goal of promoting private 
investment, including by mobilising aid resources via the IDA 
PSW (World Bank and IMF 2020). The IFC also announced a 
massive expansion of its upstream work, i.e. to set the policy 
and regulatory framework for private projects, including 
hiring 200 new staff to identify and create bankable projects 
in developing countries.57
Decades of 
austerity policies 
and privatisation 
strategies have 
underminded public 
health systems
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Figure 1: World Bank Group’s response to Covid-19
Source: WBG, 2020a and WBG, 2020b
March 2020 June 2023June 2021
US$14bn Fast Track Covid-19 Facility (FTCF)
  US$6bn from IBRD/IDA
US$2.7bn new financing from IBRD 
US$1.3bn from IDA Crisis Response 
Window (including US$865m reallocated 
from the unallocated IDA PSW
US$2bn from reprioritisation of the 
Bank’s existing portfolio
  US$8bn from IFC
This includes US$545m from the 
unallocated IDA PSW
US$160bn 
(Includes $50bn for LICs)
US$330bn ~ US$350bn
WBG’s medium to long-term pledge following initial US$14bn commitment (figures are cumulative)
US$8bn 
from IFC 
(private sector arm)
US$6bn 
from IBRD/IDA 
(public sector 
arm)
US$14bn 
Emergency Response
IFC Fast-track Covid-19 
financial support consists of 
four financing facilities
IFC Fast-track Covid-19 projects 
by sector (in value terms), 
by late June 2020
IFC Fast-track Covid-19 projects 
by type of companies, 
by late June 2020
  Support to the financial sector
• Working Capital Solutions
• Global Trade Finance
• Global Trade Liquidity
  Support to other sectors
• Real Sector Crisis Response
  Financial institutions
  Real sector companies
(private healthcare, 
agri-business/food 
processing, and others 
including tourism)
  Either majority owned by 
multinational companies or 
are themselves international 
conglomerates
  Mostly locally owned, 
usually large companies
Source: IFC website Source: IFC Covid-19 response projects 
database, according to publicly available 
information as of 10 August 2020.
Source: IFC Covid-19 response projects 
database, according to publicly available 
information as of 10 August 2020.
Figure 2: IFC’s Covid-19 emergency response
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Between March and late June, which marks the end of 
the WBG’s 2020 fiscal year, the IBRD and IDA, the public 
sector windows of the WBG, had approved Covid-19 related 
operations in 108 countries, including 33 FCSs.58 New 
commitments totalling US$ 3.8 billion financed governments’ 
purchases of health equipment, personal protective 
equipment and training, while an additional US$ 2.5 billion 
was redirected towards the Covid-19 response from an 
existing portfolio of operations under implementation. 
This reallocation raised concerns of possible future 
funding inadequacies in the absence of adequate funding 
commitments for the recovery period.59 
Meanwhile, the IFC organised its Covid-19 response 
alongside four facilities: Working Capital Solutions, Global 
Trade Finance, Real Sector Crisis Response and Global Trade 
Liquidity. With the exception of the Real Sector Envelope, 
these facilities are dedicated to supporting financial 
intermediaries (see Figure 2) and, by late June 2020, funding 
commitments amounted to US$ 3.5 billion.60 Publicly 
available information indicates that during the period 
between early April and late June 2020,61 38 individual 
projects were approved, some of which benefit from aid 
support via the IDA PSW. Indeed, the IDA PSW dramatically 
accelerated commitments as part of the Covid-19 IFC 
response: the PSW saw an envelope of commitments (just 
over US$ 0.5 billion62) between April and late June equivalent 
in size to all its commitments in the preceding two and a half 
years.63 The IFC was explicit that “to ensure that it continues 
to support private sector development in low income and 
fragile and conflict-affected countries, strong emphasis 
will be placed on supporting clients operating in these 
countries. In addition, the IFC will leverage concessional 
financing from the IDA PSW […] particularly to attract foreign 
direct investment into more challenging low income and 
fragile countries”.64 Interestingly, various high-level WBG 
staff emphasised how the pandemic presents a unique 
opportunity to mobilise blended finance.65 
Furthermore, in April 2020 the WB’s shareholders and 
the G20 Finance Ministers endorsed the Debt Service 
Suspension Initiative, acting on a pressing issue for 
developing countries. They agreed on the suspension of 
bilateral official debt service to G20 countries of 73 eligible 
low-income countries and called on private creditors to 
participate in the initiative. However, the WB limited its 
action to compel only bilateral donors to grant debt relief to 
the world’s poorest countries.66 As for relief on debts owed 
to the WB, its President expressed the reluctance of the 
institution, arguing that this would risk its AAA credit rating. 
Instead, he called for more donor contributions to facilitate 
action67 – a position that drew strong criticism from CSOs.68 
4. In sickness or in health: “Maximising Finance 
for Development” forever
A detailed analysis of the first four months (March to late 
June 2020) of the WBG’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic 
raises several issues and reveals how this pandemic 
provides an opportunity for the institution to enhance and 
accelerate its broader MFD agenda.  
Public versus private sectors in the 
World Bank Group Covid-19 response
The WBG Covid-19 response favours private sector clients 
over the public sector. The large allocation to the IFC via the 
FTCF, at almost 60 per cent, is not consistent with the WBG’s 
traditional trends in terms of commitments to public versus 
private clients. Over the last five years, its private sector 
operations via the IFC accounted for around 17 per cent 
in total commitments compared to the combined share of 
commitments via its public sector operations of around 70 per 
cent.69 Furthermore, the large share of the IFC in the FTCF is 
conflicting with multiple calls across the policy spectrum for 
stronger public systems, without accounting for the implied 
opportunity cost that every US dollar spent on de-risking or 
leveraging cannot be spent in support of public systems. 
Moreover, the WBG’s Covid-19 response reveals conflicting 
demands on the aid resources that were unused in the IDA 
PSW by the time the pandemic unfolded (see Figure 1). These 
resources amounted to around US$ 1.4 billion at the start 
of the pandemic, of which US$ 865 million were reallocated 
away from the PSW to IDA’s Critical Response Window to 
support IDA’s health Covid-19 pandemic response.70 This 
raises the question as to why all remaining resources of 
the PSW were not reallocated to the WB’s aid response 
to governments via IDA. If this had been the case, global 
capacity to respond to the health emergency and its social 
and economic fallout would have been bolstered, as opposed 
to banks and private companies benefitting from a significant 
surge in available resources.
Furthermore, despite repeated calls to strengthen public 
sector capacities to respond to the health crisis, the IFC 
announced the creation of a US$ 4 billion Global Health 
Platform “to directly support the private sector’s ability and 
capacity to deliver healthcare products and services and 
to respond to the immediate and longer-term challenges 
to developing countries’ already vulnerable health systems 
affected by Covid-19, thereby increasing the resilience and 
impact of developing countries’ healthcare systems”.71
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This situation increases the tension between the 
institution’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty and 
promoting shared prosperity. Indeed, the FTCT response 
unfolded despite shareholders’ explicit demands at the 2020 
Spring Meetings for the WBG to “help governments deploy 
resources toward public health interventions, nutrition, 
education, essential services, and social protection against 
the immediate adverse effects of the shocks.” Shareholders 
also expressed support for the “WBG’s emphasis on 
boosting government preparedness to protect human 
capital against potential subsequent waves of the outbreak 
and future pandemics” and stressed that “[efforts] should 
place special focus on fragile situations, small island states, 
and the poorest and vulnerable people in all countries, with 
attention to gender issues” (our emphasis).72 
Who benefits?
This analysis has identified the following types of clients 
as those who benefit from the IFC Covid-19 response (see 
Figure 2).
• The financial sector: In its design, 75 per cent of the 
US$ 8 billion FTCF earmarked for the IFC is meant 
to support the financial sector. According to publicly 
available information, by late June 2020 (covering the 
first four months of the WBG’s pandemic response and 
the close of its 2020 fiscal year), about 68 per cent (in 
value terms) of committed IFC Covid-19 projects targeted 
financial institutions. These are predominantly banks 
– with one beneficiary being a very large global bank, 
another the largest Mongolian microfinance institution and 
another a very large SME-oriented group of commercial 
banks with headquarters in Germany. 
• The non-financial sector: the remaining IFC 
commitments have benefited non-financial companies in 
the following sectors: private healthcare; agri-business/
food processing; and others, including tourism, for 
instance, Shangri-La Asia a leading owner and operator 
of hotels and resorts in Asia. 
• Type of clients: All the beneficiaries are existing IFC 
clients and are privately owned (with the exception of an 
Indian company). The IFC holds equity positions in some 
of the FTCF-targeted companies, which also indicates 
that the IFC itself is benefiting from these schemes (see 
examples in Box 1 and in Section 5 on Kenya). 
• Type of companies: Around 50 per cent of IFC 
supported companies are either majority-owned by 
multinational companies or are themselves international 
conglomerates. The rest are mostly locally owned, 
usually large companies, in terms of size and/or market 
share, and many are listed in domestic stock exchanges. 
For instance: Nyva, which is the second largest market 
player in the Ukrainian industrial pork market;73 the 
PRAN Group, which is the leading branded food and 
beverage group and the largest agro-processor in 
Bangladesh.74 Finally, there is the MCS, which is one of 
the largest diversified business groups in Mongolia with 
10 subsidiaries in several business sectors, including 
energy, infrastructure, information technologies, soft 
drinks, and property development.75
Box 1: Examples of IFC Covid-19 projects
A US$ 8.35 million concessionary loan (via the IDA PSW) 
to a French-South African multi-national joint venture 
(Cerba Lancet Africa), owning a network of private 
clinical diagnostic laboratories across Sub-Saharan 
Africa, to support its expansion on the continent 
including through the acquisition of existing labs. 
A US$ 4 million loan (with IDA PSW support) to the 
activities of the healthcare subsidiary (Ciel Healthcare) 
of a Mauritian conglomerate, which has operations in 
Mauritius, Uganda and Nigeria. 
A US$ 9 million loan (also with the possibility of 
drawing on concessional finance) to the largest private 
Technical and Vocational Education provider in Jordan 
(Luminus) – and previously IFC poster child “combining 
purpose with profit” (IFC 2018b). 
A loan of up to US$ 100 million to a leading Nigerian 
bank (Zenith), the board of which was considering 
distributing an interim dividend for shareholders at 
the same time as receiving financial assistance from 
the IFC. 
A US$ 50 million loan to Garanti BBVA – Turkey’s 
second largest bank, which is majority owned by BBVA 
Spain, one of the biggest global banks in the world. 
While this is only a small sample of IFC Covid-19 
projects, these transactions draw attention to the type 
of clients and activities that are benefiting from IFC (and 
IDA) resources under the fast track Covid-19 response.76
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Specifically, our analysis raises questions regarding whether 
the countries, sectors and clients most in need are actually 
being reached with support from the IFC. The emphasis 
on the financial sector relies on the assumption that it 
is imperative to protect the financial system as a way to 
reach MSMEs. This indirect approach is favoured despite 
the challenges it brings with regard to reaching micro and 
small enterprises in the poorest countries,77 let alone the 
poor, particularly given the high degree of informal sector 
work in many developing countries.78 Furthermore, as 
our analysis indicates, around 50 per cent of IFC Covid-19 
support went to beneficiaries that are either majority owned 
by international groups or are themselves international 
conglomerates. This is consistent with findings by academics 
that reveals that IFC lending tends to favour companies 
from major IFC shareholders based in the global north,79 
and raises questions regarding the alleged additionality and 
development impact of IFC resources. Also, while the IFC has 
committed to deliver 40 per cent of its annual commitments 
in IDA countries and FCS, its support to these countries has 
remained low over the last five years, indicating the IFC’s low 
tolerance for risk.80 At the same time, there is little evidence 
that these investments benefit the poorest and most 
vulnerable. A 2019 evaluation report states that “creating 
markets in a manner that allows the poor to participate 
in markets or benefit from such efforts has remained a 
challenge [...] Evidence of the direct welfare implication of 
market creation efforts for the poor is lacking”.81
Furthermore, as a result of increasing CSO pressure (see 
the example of Kenya in Section 5), in early March, the 
WBG committed to enact a “freeze on direct investments 
in private for-profit K-12 [from kindergarten to 12th grade] 
schools […], which will also apply to any advisory and indirect 
investments through new funds, including with existing 
clients.” The announcement also called for an evaluation to 
be carried out by the WB’s Independent Evaluation Group, to 
look at the impacts of such schools on educational outcomes, 
access, poverty and inequality. This is a “milestone decision” 
that results from growing recognition of the negative 
impacts of private, for-profit education, which needs to be 
closely monitored.82 However, in the context of the Covid-19 
pandemic – which has resulted in an education crisis – the 
WBG continues to play an active role in the education sector 
by supporting tertiary education (see the case of Luminus in 
Box 1) and disseminating a problematic vision of education, 
through its “knowledge products”, that supports an increased 
role of for-profit providers.83 
Transparency, accountability and participation challenges 
The WBG’s response to Covid-19 poses clear 
implementation challenges with regard to the transparency 
and accountability of its operations and stakeholder 
engagement, particularly at the national level. The fast track 
facility grants specific waivers and exceptions to enable 
rapid preparation and implementation of programmes 
processed under the facility.84 This clashes with transparency 
commitments85 and with adequate stakeholder engagement 
practices that seek to ensure informed public consultations 
and active civil society participation. With increased pressure 
to “get money out the door”, there has been very limited (if 
any) stakeholder engagement as projects are rolled out.86 
This is even more concerning given how the pandemic has 
constrained freedom of movement87 and the shrinking of 
civil society space in many countries for local communities 
opposing development projects (notably, large infrastructure 
projects that imply community displacement).88
It is worth noting that in response to ongoing criticism 
regarding the lack of transparency and accountability of IFC 
operations, the WBG President assured shareholders, and in 
particular the US, that it would increase the transparency and 
effectiveness of IFC operations. As part of the congressional 
approval for the IFC capital increase,89 the WBG President 
agreed to a set of reform commitments, including greater 
transparency with regard to the IFC’s financial intermediary 
portfolio and IDA subsidies that the IFC gives to private 
firms to ensure that more subsidies are awarded on a 
competitive basis.90 This was a clear victory of CSOs that 
have long campaigned for greater transparency “to promote 
stronger due diligence in higher risk investments made by 
IFC’s commercial bank clients, in particular to ensure the 
environment and communities are not being negatively 
impacted and that there is accountability when they are.”91 In 
the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, there is still significant 
information missing to provide a full picture of who benefits 
from the IFC support to the financial sector. 
Structural reforms persist
Although support from the Bank’s public sector windows 
has been portrayed as aiming to strengthen public health 
systems, recipient countries are urged not to forego 
“structural reforms” focused on liberalisation and 
deregulation. The WBG President insisted in his address 
to the G20 Finance in late March: “Countries will need to 
implement structural reforms to help shorten the time to 
recovery and create confidence that the recovery can be 
strong. For those countries that have excessive regulations, 
subsidies, licensing regimes, trade protection or litigiousness 
as obstacles, we will work with them to foster markets, 
choice and faster growth prospects during the recovery”.92 
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Indeed, while most of the IBRD/IDA loans (and grants) 
approved in this period seek to address the health crisis, 
others have a broader scope and include more traditional 
reforms in support of the private sector. These include: 
• Safeguarding the implementation of reforms that 
enhance foreign private sector participation in 
the national economy (in energy, logistics and 
telecommunications in Ethiopia.
• Generating private investment and enhancing public 
sector capacity to deliver on the government’s inclusive 
growth agenda in Kenya.
• Fostering private participation in gas infrastructure and 
telecommunications in Senegal.
• Developing reforms “that are expected to support 
economic diversification by enhancing openness and 
attracting more investments into key sectors, relaxing 
trade barriers, reforming State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
and increasing infrastructure investment” in Indonesia.
• Removing “barriers to private sector development” 
and promoting “public sector efficiency and fiscal 
sustainability post-crisis”, which implies containing the 
public wage bill in Ecuador.”93 
This indicates a strong and continuing commitment by the 
WBG to a market-driven approach which, among other 
things, has resulted in adverse health outcomes and has had 
negative impacts on gender equality.94 
One WBG in support of the private sector
Moving forward, the WBG aims to capitalise on its One 
WBG strategy which was launched in 2013 to strengthen 
synergies across its different affiliates in support of 
scaling up private sector solutions.95 As highlighted in a 
WBG Covid-19 Crisis Response Approach Paper projecting 
the WBG’s “longer duration approach” to the crisis response: 
“the approach emphasises selectivity and public-private 
joint interventions to scale up private sector solutions while 
staying focused on results”.96  While the WBG emphasises 
its explicit commitment to “achieving resilient, inclusive 
and sustainable recovery in a world transformed by the 
coronavirus”,97 its approach is strongly characterised by a 
persistent, and reinvigorated, celebration of private over 
public sector solutions to development challenges. The 
prejudice against the public sector remains staggering, 
despite a dearth of analytical or empirical evidence to 
underpin such a strong bias. The inclusion of “stronger public 
involvement in the economy” in its summary of possible 
long-lasting negative consequences of the pandemic is 
emblematic of this problematic bias.98 This combines with 
an emphasis on private sector solutions in its approach to 
“rebuilding better”. The WBG insists that the fiscal headroom 
and debt capacity of developing countries are likely to be 
constrained post crisis which becomes its renewed rationale 
for further promoting private sector solutions.99 
The WBG is explicit about its strategy: “It will be important 
to crowd-in private participation in delivery of certain 
public services and infrastructure. […] Governments can 
devise public-private schemes that leverage public and 
private resources and capabilities […] Governments can 
establish dedicated PPP units, as well as develop PPP legal 
frameworks, guidelines, operating procedures and tools […] 
Levelling the playing field and enabling greater competition in 
local markets, especially in sectors that tend to be dominated 
by SOEs, could improve service delivery, lower costs and 
increase domestic revenue mobilization through privatization, 
dividend distribution, royalties and concession fees, as 
well as general corporate taxes”.100 Furthermore, the WBG 
forewarns us that it will be selective in its support and will 
give priority to “sustainable private sector solutions where 
possible”.101 So, rather than exploiting the opportunities 
provided by the Covid-19 crisis for a comprehensive overhaul, 
including promoting a fairer tax system and advocating for 
comprehensive debt relief, both of which would strengthen 
the public sector’s capacity to rebuild better, the fragilities 
of the public sector will be exploited to continue to promote 
private sector solutions. 
The persistent 
commitment to 
private finance at the 
heart of development 
proceeds without a 
clear analytical or 
empirical rationale
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Our analysis suggests that the WBG sees this pandemic as an 
opportunity to supercharge its agenda of Maximising private 
Finance for Development. This includes a focus on PPPs 
(through advisory services, policy guidelines and finance),102 
as a way to finance infrastructure and public service 
provision, which proceeds despite weak evidence to support 
this approach and fast-growing literature denouncing its 
multiple risks.103 WBG support for PPP-related projects has 
indeed proceeded apace during the Covid-19 crisis. The 
IFC has advised road PPP projects in Brazil, a PPP project 
in renewable energy in India, a healthcare PPP project 
in Vietnam, and offers support in developing pipelines of 
unsolicited PPP proposals, which are those conceptualised 
by private companies instead of the public sector, with a US$ 
1.4 billion advisory services project. The WB has supported 
governments to advance reforms aimed at de-risking private 
investment and advancing the PPP agenda in Nigeria, Kenya 
and Uganda.104 As the Global Director of Infrastructure Finance, 
PPPs and Guarantees Group at the WB, Imad Fakhoury, 
explains: “The reality is that we need more resilient PPP and 
contractual frameworks going forward. PPPs, as a means 
to deliver infrastructure, are in constant evolution, as is 
governments’ capacity to effectively procure and implement 
them. Continued focus on the development of infrastructure 
as an asset class will help move this along.”105The WBG hopes 
to accelerate government actions that facilitate its MFD 
agenda, including “to mutualize risks, reform underperforming 
sectors, level the playing field with subsidy removals, open up 
competition, and provide guarantees and other forms of risk 
mitigation and credit enhancement”.106   
This persistent commitment to private finance at the heart 
of development proceeds without any clear analytical or 
empirical rationale107  and raises a host of issues that have 
been highlighted by academics and CSOs for many years.108 
These range across fiscal liabilities  as risks remain with 
the public sector, fragmentation of public service provision, 
cherry-picking by private investors, lack of context-specific 
design of public service provision, worsening employment 
conditions in privately financed public sectors, higher costs 
of, and inequitable access to public services, redistributions 
from households in developing countries to shareholders 
of privately financed public services against the backdrop 
of historic inequality, lack of flexibility due to long-term 
contractual terms, and so  forth.109
The next section examines the effects of privileging private 
over public agents in the Kenyan context. We focus on Kenya 
as a pilot country of the WB’s MFD approach and a recipient 
of a range of WBG instruments. 
5. Maximising Finance for Development at work: 
Kenya as a pilot country
Kenya is a long-standing client of the WBG and was selected 
as one of nine pilot countries of the MFD approach in 
2017.110 This means that the WBG is working closely with its 
government to crowd in the private sector, “while optimising 
the use of scarce public resources”.111 The selection of Kenya 
as a pilot builds on its long-standing relationship with the WB 
and implies a more consistent approach to market creation – 
work that was already ongoing prior to 2017. In this section, 
we reflect on the implications of private sector bias within the 
Kenyan economy, including public service provision. This has 
several dimensions and speaks to the multiple roles of the 
WBG, including as a financier, advisor and standard setter. 
Since early 2010s, the WB has approved several loans to 
shape Kenya’s national regulatory framework in support 
of PPPs. A 2012 WB loan (US$ 40 million) was approved 
“to increase private investment in the Kenya infrastructure 
market across sectors and to sustain this participation over 
an extended period of time”.112 To that purpose the loan 
finances policy reforms to create an “enabling environment” 
for PPPs, so that a pipeline of bankable projects can be 
produced. This involved technical support to change the PPP 
legal regulatory and financing environment and support 
for the preparation of individual PPPs. The loan resulted 
in a new PPP law, the creation of a PPP Unit, which works 
under the National Treasury to promote and oversee the 
implementation of PPPs. The loan also covered large 
outlays for various advisors, with tenders for transaction 
advisors still pending when this paper was published, each 
in excess of US$ 1 million, including for hospital PPPs, 
toll road PPPs, and a bridge PPP.113 Moreover, a 2017 WB 
loan (US$ 50 million) supported a project facilitation fund 
to finance viability gaps. This is to “make projects more 
attractive to private investors and act as a liquidity reserve 
for contingent liabilities”.114 As of January 2020, all this work 
had translated into a pipeline of 80 PPP projects in different 
sectors, including in transport, energy, health, education and 
environment, water and natural resources.115 
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Furthermore, as part of the implementation of the MFD, the 
WBG released the Country Private Sector Diagnostic for 
Kenya in 2019. This is a tool designed to “assess opportunities 
for and constraints to private-sector led growth”.116 The 
report “sheds light on how the private sector can more 
effectively contribute to advancing the country’s development 
goals” and “seeks to inform World Bank and IFC strategies, 
paving the way for joint programming to create markets and 
unlock private sector potential”.117 The report focuses on 
sectors like energy, health, information computer technology 
and transport and includes specific policy recommendations, 
such as “enhancing the business enabling environment”, 
“strengthening competition policy and removing barriers to 
market entry” and “linking the formal and informal sectors”. 
The report highlights how “prospects for PPPs are favourable 
in equipment supply, e-health, training and education, health 
insurance, and the establishment of new private hospitals”.118 
Despite the comprehensive approach by the WBG to market 
creation and promotion of private sector involvement 
across different sectors in Kenya, important questions arise 
regarding its implications for core public sector provisioning. 
Health
The IFC has persistently played an active role in developing 
a market for healthcare providers across Africa, while 
the Kenyan government has been encouraged to pursue 
health PPPs for many years.119 For instance, in 2009, the 
IFC launched the Health in Africa initiative, a US$ 1 billion 
investment project whose stated objective was to improve 
access to healthcare. This initiative included the Africa Health 
Fund and Investment Fund for Health in Africa which, through 
financial intermediaries, invested in insurance companies 
and private clinics.120 This model of health finance has raised 
several concerns as it reveals significant policy incoherence 
and can fuel inequality.121 In particular, a 2014 Oxfam study 
found no evidence that either fund targeted low-income 
users in practice or measured their attempts to do so.122
Moreover, in 2010, the WB “found that the private commercial 
health sector has the potential to play a greater role in 
providing quality care to Kenyans”.123 A report, entitled 
“Private Health Sector Assessment in Kenya”, put forward 
several recommendations to “maximise the private sector 
role in health”, including the creation of a new PPP in Health 
Unit (housed by the Ministry of Health) to implement PPPs, 
the formalisation of the public-private collaboration in 
key health markets such as antiretroviral treatment and 
reproductive health services and the expansion of the private 
insurance sector “to create more health insurance products 
for lower income Kenyans”.124
As part of this process, in 2015, the Kenyan government 
selected five foreign private sector companies for a seven-
year PPP project for the supply, installation, maintenance 
of and training on diagnostics imaging equipment (Managed 
Equipment Services Partnership, MESP) across 98 public 
hospitals.125 The companies involved in this project, in 
order of contract amount, are: the US’s General Electric 
Healthcare, India’s Esteem Industries, the Dutch’s Philips 
Medical Systems, China’s Shenzhen Mindray Bio-medical 
LTD and Italy’s Bellco SRL. According to the WB, this 
contract “enables citizens to adopt a ‘pay for service’ 
expenditure plan and affords a number of financial benefits 
including funding to cover equipment, maintenance and 
other project costs such as training.”126 Importantly, the 
Bank praised the Kenyan government for this project as 
it represents a “model to be replicated in other African 
countries.” However, critics – including Kenya’s first auditor 
general – have highlighted that “high tech machines are 
lying idle in more than a third of the hospitals that received 
them” as there was no proper planning, and have argued 
that the project “has worsened the country’s debt burden 
and diverted urgently needed resources from basic 
healthcare that would otherwise save lives.”127
These concerns have resulted in a parliamentarian 
investigation at the Senate level, resulting in the publication 
of a report in September 2020 calling the project a 
“criminal enterprise” as the cost of the equipment supplied 
“was grossly exaggerated.”128 Feminist economic justice 
specialists Simeoni and Kinoti recently concluded that 
the project “led to gaps in priority setting, a redirection of 
resources to ‘non-essential’ specialised equipment, as well 
as less access by women to this specialised equipment”. 
They go on to say that “the MESP shines a spotlight on the 
wider question of what lies at the heart of development 
decisions and who is part of that process. Kenyan public 
services – publicly-funded and universally delivered - were 
and continue to be in a state of collapse. An unequal and 
undemocratic extractive global economic governance 
system lies at the heart of this collapse.”129 
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At the same time, the implementation of the PPP agenda 
in the health sector has moved forward with the Kenyatta 
National Hospital’s PPP project. The Kenyatta National 
Hospital is the largest referral, teaching and research hospital 
in Kenya and, in October 2019, called for bids to construct 
a new PPP 300-bed hospital in Nairobi were issued.130 The 
PPP will be a 30-year contract and the private company 
will be able to recover their costs and make a profit before 
transferring it to the State – in practice, this means charging 
user fees to patients and deepening market practices in the 
health sector. The plan for this project was conceived back in 
2012 but, according to media reports, gained momentum in 
2018 when the hospital contracted a consortium from Ernst & 
Young Kenya, India and UK to conduct a feasibility study on the 
technical configuration, affordability and commercial viability 
of the project.131 This is despite the high-profile abandonment 
of such PPP arrangements for the construction of new 
hospitals in the UK, an erstwhile enthusiastic adopter and 
promoter of the practice.132
Furthermore, private healthcare providers have been 
questioned for their problematic practices in Kenya. In 
February 2020, it was revealed that executives at the Nairobi 
Women’s Hospital, a private equity fund-owned enterprise 
(TPG’s Evercare Health Fund with the IFC as equity investor 
under the Health in Africa initiative), encouraged staff to 
drive up admission numbers and prevent discharges, carry 
out unnecessary tests as well as prescribe expensive and 
unnecessary medications.133 
Education
The WB has been criticised by CSOs for fuelling the 
privatisation of the sector, including by supporting 
controversial for-profit corporate chains at the expense of 
funding free, inclusive and quality public systems. In 2018, 
Kenyan citizens registered a complaint134 with the IFC’s 
Ombudsman following controversy regarding the practices 
of Bridge International Academies135 – a for-profit company 
that runs low-cost private schools across Africa, including 
nearly 300 in Kenya.136 The complaint raised alarms bells 
regarding Bridge schools’ working conditions, insufficient 
access for children with special needs, the lack of adherence 
to relevant health and safety requirements, lack of parental 
inclusion and economic discrimination. The Ombudsman 
found grounds for further investigation, as some of the issues 
represented a breach of IFC’s performance standards. The 
investigation is due to conclude by September 2020.137
Transport
The need to develop and rehabilitate 10,000km of the national 
roads network has translated into a pipeline of separate 
“lots”, each accounting for less than 100km of road, which are 
packaged into separate PPPs in which the private investor 
will be compensated via fixed and performance-related 
annuities by the public sector over ten years. As of January 
2020,138 just six of these “lots” were at “advanced stages of 
the PPP process”. One of the projects in the pipeline, the first 
toll highway outside Nairobi (Nairobi-Nakuru-Mau Summit 
Highway project), was in the news in late September 2020, 
as the government signed a 30-year PPP deal worth US$ 1.5 
billion with a consortium of French firms, Rift Valley Connect, 
led by Meridiam Infrastructure Africa Fund.139 Under the PPP 
model, the consortium will be expected to recover its funds 
from the road through user fees (tolls), while the Kenyan 
government will guarantee availability of traffic, through a 
toll fund recently enacted by the National Assembly.140 
While no one would contest the need for upgrading of the 
Kenyan road network, the question arises whether the 
current approach provides the most cost-effective way to do 
so. Parcelling up the road network into discrete (and small) 
lots that have clearly identified revenue streams (via the 
public purse) so that they can attract private (often foreign) 
investors reflects imperatives of private finance at the 
expense of an integrated publicly financed approach where 
planning, procurement and execution can reap economies of 
scale as well as reflect developmental imperatives (beyond 
bankability) and a broader redistributive mandate. 
In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic
The WBG has continued its efforts to promote the private 
sector in Kenya, at different levels and across different 
sectors. While the WB approved a US$ 50 million loan 
“to prevent, detect and respond to the threat posed by 
Covid-19 and strengthen national systems for public health 
preparedness,”141 the focus of the interventions continues 
to be on crowding in private investment. A US$ 1 billion 
development policy loan focused on “inclusive growth and 
fiscal management” was approved on 19 May 2020.142 This 
loan seeks to support further reforms in support of crowding 
in private investments, including PPPs,143 and “specific 
areas that require urgent attention include the need to 
allow for arbitration hearings to occur in an internationally 
acceptable seat of arbitration and the critical need to widen 
the definition of political events covered by the Government 
Support Mechanism Policy and the Letter of Support issued 
for PPP projects”.144 The policy loan clearly demonstrates that 
“the WBG remains committed to support the government in 
advancing the PPP agenda in Kenya.”145 
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The IFC, on the other hand, approved several projects in 
support of financing institutions that operate in Kenya. For 
instance, it approved a US$ 50 million loan to the Diamond 
Trust Bank Kenya, the 7th largest bank in Kenya and an Africa 
conglomerate active in neighbouring countries;146 and a 
US$ 50 million loan to the Equity Bank Kenya,147 the second-
largest bank in Kenya and a subsidiary of a group with 
operations across East Africa) as part of its FTCF working 
capital solution programme. It also acquired a minority stake 
in the supermarket chain, Naivas International Limited, for 
US$ 15 million, co-investing with the French private equity 
fund Amethis Finance.148
As demonstrated, the MFD approach successfully embeds 
the private sector across core public service provisioning. 
This can be seen as part of the implementation of the Wall 
Street Consensus described by Professor Gabor,149 which 
seeks to reorganise development interventions around selling 
development finance to the market. The agenda proceeds 
unimpeded by the pandemic, despite multiple concerns 
regarding its implications for development, poverty eradication 
or welfare provision, which have been raised with regards to 
Kenya and other countries.150
6. Conclusion and policy recommendations
In response to the economic and social crises that developing 
countries face as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, the WBG 
has approved emergency response (FTCF) of US$ 14 billion 
and committed US$ 160 billion in finance over the next 15 
months. This briefing analyses this response and highlights 
the centrality of the private sector in the WBG’s approach to 
the pandemic and in the recovery phase. 
The briefing details five main features of the WBG’s 
response to the pandemic. 
1. The IFC and its private clients have prevailed in terms of 
resource allocation, design and implementation of Covid-
19-related projects. The focus on the private sector also 
includes renewed support for IFC’s use of blended finance. 
2. IFC financial sector clients and multinational companies 
have particularly benefited from the pandemic response. 
By late June 2020, about 68 per cent (in value terms) of 
IFC Covid-19 projects targeted financial institutions. This 
ostensibly seeks to assist MSMEs in navigating the fallout 
from the pandemic, but this strategy is yet to produce 
results. In addition, around 50 per cent of IFC supported 
companies are either majority-owned by multinational 
companies or are themselves international conglomerates.
3. Despite the support from the WB’s public arms (IBRD and 
IDA) being portrayed as aiming to strengthen public health 
systems, recipient countries have been urged to undergo 
structural reforms aimed at strengthening markets 
through practices such as liberalisation and deregulation. 
These policy conditions are at odds with the need to 
strengthen state capacity to deal with the multiple crises of 
the pandemic, climate change and inequality.
4. The increased pressure to “get money out the door” 
has raised clear implementation challenges. The IFC’s 
focus on financial intermediaries has fallen short of 
transparency and accountability standards, while on the 
WB’s side there have been questions about stakeholder 
engagement as projects are rolled out. This comes on 
top of shrinking space for CSOs to actively participate 
and increased reprisals against human rights activists.
5. Finally, the WBG continues with the MFD approach by 
placing PPPs, and the private sector more broadly, at the 
centre of the recovery. 
The Covid-19 pandemic has provided the WBG with an 
opportunity to enhance its MFD approach. As the Kenya 
case study illustrates, the implementation of this approach 
implies a consistent and coherent approach to market 
creation, which translates into concrete interventions and 
practices at the national level. The centrality of the private 
sector in development in general, and public service 
provisioning in particular, is being strengthened both in 
discourse and practices, despite little, if any, evidence in 
support of such an approach. This will be compounded by 
the limited fiscal space that developing countries are likely 
face in the post-Covid-19 era.151
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Policy recommendations
The Covid-19 pandemic has the potential to dramatically 
undermine the slow progress made by developing countries 
towards achieving the SDGs. 
This briefing suggests short-term policy recommendations, 
focused on the Covid-19 response, and long-term measures 
that would allow to better connect the institution with its 
core mandate. 
In the short term:  
• The WBG needs to restore the balance between the public 
and private sector in its Covid-19 response, including in 
its modalities and instruments. Developing countries are 
in need of concessional resources to strengthen their 
public systems, particularly health, education and social 
protection, and to stimulate the economic recovery. 
Importantly, the WBG Covid-19 response should not 
contribute to deepening the debt problem.  
• Both in its emergency response and with regard to long-
term finance, the WBG should abandon policy conditions 
that undermine economic policies and regulatory 
measures aimed at strengthening domestic economies, 
jobs and livelihoods and civic rights. This includes 
abandoning those policy conditions that favour the 
private sector and undermine the strengthening of public 
services and the delivery of public goods. 
• The WBG should make sure its emergency and long-term 
programmes are consistent with and strengthen climate 
resilience and the shift to low carbon pathways. This 
implies a review and disclosure of carbon implications of 
the projects and policies it promotes, while phasing out 
and avoiding involvement in projects that exacerbate the 
climate crisis in the name of the Covid-19 response.
• The IFC should commit to publicly disclosing recipients 
of resources, as well as the purpose of this support. 
This would ensure that IFC programmes help preserve 
employment and do not serve to bail out private financial 
institutions. 
• The IFC should stop its support for commercial private 
health facilities that undermine public system building 
that also arguably have pernicious implications for 
women, lower-income or vulnerable populations. 
In the long term:
Given the evidence that highlights the problematic track-
record of the MFD, it is imperative that the WBG re-evaluates 
this approach. If the WBG wishes to “build back better”, it 
needs to consider the broad implications of its agenda and 
move towards a human rights-based approach that builds 
resilience and strengthens public systems. 
At its core, this will require adequate levels of public finance 
to be achieved through, among other things, tackling tax 
avoidance and evasion, and by using ODA to strengthen 
the provision of public services. The WBG, as a leading 
development actor, should rethink its approach to blended 
finance. Moreover, immediate cancellation of debt payments 
should be linked to a more comprehensive approach to debt 
crisis resolution, under the auspices of the UN. This would 
allow for an equitable and resilient recovery in line with the 
SDG and Paris commitments. 
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